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Abstract  
 
 
This study poses the questions if Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) producing firms 
have market power, how high price-cost margins are and if market power is higher in the 
early periods of the product life cycle of an SRAM chip. For this purpose, the method of the 
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) is applied and a model related to the work of 
Genesove and Mullin (1998) is set up. The model consists of a demand function and a 
pricing relation, which are estimated for four SRAM generations. Different marginal cost 
specificatons lead to different pricing relations. The (industry-level) SRAM data are from 
Gartner, Inc, the price of silicon (the main cost factor) stems from Metall Bulletin Ltd. 
Reasonable estimates for marginal costs and market conduct were only found for two 
generations. According to these outcomes, firms operate in an oligopolistic market and have 
thus, some market power to raise price above marginal cost. The market of the 64KB SRAM 
chip is more competitive than of the 256KB SRAM chip. But these results should be watched 
critically, since results of other generations are dissatisfying and thus, the model cannot be 
adapted to the whole SRAM industry. The positive relationship of prices and Lerner indices 
suggests that market power is high when prices are high, which is the case in the year after 
market introduction. But the estimates of the model indicate, that the opposite is the case. A 
concrete answer cannot be given.  
 
   
  9 
 
Contents  
 
 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................11 
 
2 Literature review................................................................................................................15 
 
3 Industry facts and data ......................................................................................................17 
3.1 Description of the SRAM industry ...............................................................................17 
3.2 Description of the data set ..........................................................................................18 
 
4 The model .........................................................................................................................23 
4.1 Demand model ...........................................................................................................24 
4.2 Supply model..............................................................................................................25 
4.3 Estimation Method......................................................................................................29 
4.3.1 Instrumental variable estimation ..........................................................................30 
4.3.2 Two stage least squares estimation .....................................................................31 
 
5 Results ..............................................................................................................................33 
5.1 Demand side ..............................................................................................................33 
5.2 Supply side.................................................................................................................37 
 
6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................43 
 
References...........................................................................................................................47 
 
A Appendix...........................................................................................................................49 
A.1 Derivation of the pricing rule.......................................................................................49 
A.2 List of abbreviations and variables .............................................................................51 
A.3 List of Tables..............................................................................................................53 
A.4 List of Figures.............................................................................................................55 
A.5 Zusammenfassung.....................................................................................................57 
A.6 Curriculum Vitae.........................................................................................................59 
 
 
   
 
  11 
 
1 Introduction  
 
 
Identifying price-cost margins and market conduct are interesting fields of economic 
research. The purpose is to get measures or estimates of market conduct, i.e. if firms (a) 
collude within the market (cartel), if they (b) operate in an oligopoly market or if they (c) 
behave like competitors. Market conduct and price-cost margins are connected to each other 
through market power. The definition of market power says that it is is “the ability of a firm to 
profitably raise price above marginal cost”1. Firms that operate as mentioned in (a) have high 
market power and as a consequence a high price-costs margin. Oligopolists – (b) – have still 
market power and prices are therefore still higher than marginal cost. In (c), which presents 
an industry with perfect competition, firms have no market power and thus, prices equal 
marginal costs.  
 
Empirical studies on this issue are worked out from the 1940s on. A method, which was 
established in the early periods, is called the “structure-conduct-performance paradigm” 
(SCPP) and concentrates on cross-section samples. It searches for observable structural 
characteristics of a market to see how firms behave in the market and get measures for 
price-cost margins (market performance). So, this approach is less theoretical, but focusses 
on measurable facts and characterictics.2 Since not everybody believed, that price-cost 
margins can be directly observed from accounting data, another method – the “new empirical 
industrial organization” (NEIO) approach – was developed. This method is based on the fact 
that firms usually do not reveal complete information about the structure of their production 
process, about (marginal) cost of production and their mark-up. Only prices and the number 
of sold units are really available. Thus, I can only estimate price-cost margins with an 
econometrical model. In the next chapter, I give a short summary of some papers that deal 
with the NEIO method. For my work, I also used the NEIO approach and applied it on the 
semiconductor industry – or, to be more precise, on the Static Random Access Memory 
(SRAM) industry.  
 
The semiconductor industry is an interesting field for economic research, because 
semiconductors are an important input to several high-technology industries. Since various 
papers have already been written on the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) market, 
                                                 
1
 Church (2000), p. 29 
2
 Martin (2002)  
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I chose to concentrate on the related SRAM market. Another fact that argues for analyzing 
this market is, that the structure of the production process seems simple and clear: the main 
cost factor in producing SRAM chips is the price of silicon. SRAM chips are grouped in 
different generations, which reflect the memory capacity in kilobyte (KB) or megabyte (MB).  
 
Figure 1 shows the positive impact of the price of silicon on the price of an SRAM chip of four 
selected generations. Taking a look on the prices close to 0, this statement is still true. For 
higher SRAM prices, which appear in the first period of the product life cycle of SRAM chips, 
it seems that there have to be other influence factors too (especially for the 64KB and the 
256KB generation). This may be an indicator for some market power in the industry.  
 
Figure 1:  Comparison of the price of silicon and the price of an SRAM-chip in US-
Dollar, for 4 selected generations 
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Notes:  Prices are in constant US-Dollar. The data are from Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd.  
 
The method, that is adequate for my thesis comes from the work of Genesove and Mullin 
(1998). In their paper, they “test” the NEIO approach by comparing the estimates, which they 
received by applying the NEIO method, with measures from the U.S. East Coast cane sugar 
refining industry in the years 1890-1914. Such measures are available for that industry since 
the production process is simple. So they can be quite sure about the strucural form of 
marginal cost. They have also the prices of raw and refined sugar and very good estimates 
of labor and other costs at their disposal, and can therefore directly measure marginal cost 
and a price-cost margin. The authors conclude that the NEIO method performs reasonably 
well.  
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The sugar refining industry mentioned above is in a way comparable with the SRAM industry 
(which is my field of interest - details of market and data in the chapter 3) as the structure of 
the production process is transparent too. The main factor of production is silicon 
(comparable with raw sugar in the sugar refining industry), which is transformed at a fixed 
coefficient into SRAM chips (refined sugar in the sugar industry). Therefore I deduced that 
the methodology used by Genesove and Mullin (1998) would also work well if it is adapted to 
the SRAM market.  
 
First of all, a linear demand equation is estimated. With the derived demand elasticity and a 
marginal cost function, that includes the price of silicon, I set up a pricing relation. The 
regression of this equation produces estimates of market conduct and of the parameters of 
the cost function. The data that I can make use of are on an industry level. Therefore, my 
estimates of price-cost margins and market conduct give an average of all firms in the 
industry.  
 
My diploma thesis can be summarized by saying that cost, demand and firm conduct of the 
SRAM industry are (in contrast to industry price and quantity) unknown and getting estimates 
of them is the goal.3  
 
The questions I pose in my diploma thesis are:  
 
• Do firms engaging in the production of SRAM chips have market power, and to what 
extent can they raise price above marginal cost?  
• Is market power higher in the early periods of the product life cycle?  
 
In the next chapter, I summarize some papers that concentrate on the implementation of the 
NEIO approach on different industries. Chapter 3 describes the term “SRAM”, the production 
process and the properties of an SRAM chip. Furthermore, the data that will be analyzed is 
presented. In Chapter 4 I set up the model, divided into demand and supply model, and write 
about the estimation method I apply on the demand model (two stages least squares 
estimation). Chapter 5 gives the required test statistics and lists the results of the demand 
and supply relation. This paper ends with a conclusion in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                 
3
 Bresnahan (1989)  
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2 Literature review  
 
 
There exist many papers following the NEIO issue, but this approach can be used in different 
ways. Most of the authors concentrate in deriving a parameter for market conduct to check if 
the industry is dominated by collusive, oligopolistic or competitive behaviour.  
 
Bresnahan (1982) solves the identification problem by adding an interaction term between 
price and a demand-side exogenous variable (e.g. the price of a substitute good) in the 
demand equation. The demand function is now able to capture changes of the demand slope 
and not only up- and down-shifts of the intercept. Therefore, one can distinguish if the 
equilibrium comes from the marginal cost function either of a monopolist or of a competitor 
and the parameter indexing the degree of market power is identified. Lau (1982) figures out – 
based on the work of Bresnahan (1982) – the conditions under which the parameter for 
market conduct can be identified. As a result, he gets an impossibility theorem, that states 
under which assumptions the parameter cannot be identified.  
 
The underlying article for many of the papers, that deal with the identification of market 
conduct and firm behavior in a market is that of Porter (1983). Porter concentrates here on 
the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886, which controlled eastbound 
freight shipments from Chicago to the Atlantic seaboard. He tests whether significant 
switches between Cournot and collusive output levels occur and tries to identify the periods 
in which they took place. He concludes that the changes in price and quantity are not only 
due to exogenous changes in demand and structural conditions, but arise from switches in 
firm behavior.  
 
An extension to the model of Porter (1983) is the paper of Mariuzzo and Walsh (2006). They 
can now make use of weekly transportation prices of grain over the Great Lakes and Canals. 
Furthermore, they estimate the mark-up (price-cost margin/unobservable term) by using 
“semi-parametric techniques”. Compared to Porter’s (1983) model, Mariuzzo’s and Walsh’s 
(2006) model explains 77 % of pricing instead of just 36 %. Moreover, they demonstrate that 
mark-ups were higher in the weeks before lakes closing than in the weeks before lakes 
opening. In other words, the variable ‘number of weeks to lakes closing’ induces the mark-up 
to rise, whereas the ‘number of weeks to lakes opening’ lets the mark-up decrease.  
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Panzar and Rosse (1987) set up a test to check if a firm acts like a profit maximizing 
monopolist. They find out that “[t]he sum of the factor price elasticities of a monopolist’s 
reduced form revenue equation must be nonpositive.”4 This method has the advantage, that 
it captures changes in costs even if the cost data is unavailable (which is mostly the case). 
For the sum being positive, they broaden their concept to test for monopolistically 
competitive, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive markets.  
 
Bresnahan (1987) gives an explanation for the increase in the American automobile 
production in 1955. He claims that there was a supply shock in the form of a change in the 
industry conduct in such a way that the industry gets more competitive. Thus, the author 
tests the hypothesis, that the price war in 1955 is attended by the situation that collusive 
conduct switches over to competitive conduct only in 1955, with industry data. He can reject 
the hypothesis, that this is not the case.  
 
A work, which uses firm-level data, is that of Zulehner (2003). She deals with learning-by-
doing effects and spillovers in the dynamic random access memory (DRAM) market. DRAM 
chips can to some extent be compared with SRAM (static random access memory) chips, as 
the more has been produced in the past, the cheaper is the production process per unit in 
the present. Thus, she poses the question, whether firms precommit themselves to a 
production plan or whether they care for the effect, that learning-by-doing and spillovers have 
on the future output decision of their competitors. Therefore, she sets up two specifications, 
the closed-loop no memory and the open-loop equilibrium relation. Thereafter, she tests 
whether the intertemporal strategic parameters (which describe the difference between the 
two specifications) are jointly significant, and rejects the open-loop specification if this is the 
case. Later in the paper, she analyzes the trend of the estimated intertemporal strategic 
effects and compares the price-cost margins of the two specifications. She concludes, that 
firms take the strategic effect, that their output decision has on their rivals’ future output 
decision, into account. Thus, she can reject the open-loop specification.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Panzar and Rosse (1987), p. 445.  
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3 Industry facts and data  
 
 
3.1 Description of the SRAM industry  
 
SRAM is the abbreviation for Static Random Access Memory. So it is a type of 
semiconductor memory. “The term ‘semiconductor’ refers to a class of material with electrical 
properties between conductors and insulators.”5  
 
SRAM chips are, like other semiconductors, produced in batches on silicon wafers. The 
production is a complex photolithographic sequence, which includes many different 
processes of manufacturing. The rooms, in which production takes place, have to be very 
clean, because even a tiny dust particle on the wafer leads to a defective chip. Since it is not 
possible to have a perfect raw silicon wafer, some chips are always faulty, but this part can 
be reduced to a very small percentage rate. The last stage of production is to cut the wafer, 
test and assemble the chips. The wafer processing stage is the most critical and also the 
most costly since the silicon material is the main cost factor in the production of a chip.6 
 
SRAM holds data as long as power is supplied to the circuit. In contrast to DRAM (dynamic 
random access memory), it does not have to be periodically refreshed to retain its data. 
Other advantages are that it provides faster memory access times and can in some 
applications need less power than DRAM. But SRAM needs more space (because it uses 
more than one transistor) than DRAM and is more expensive in production for the same 
reason.7  
 
SRAM is used in automotive electronics, digital cameras, cell phones, synthesizers, but also 
in personal computers, routers and other electronic devices.8 The important semiconductor 
companies are situated in the U.S.A. and in Japan, such as Intel, Texas Instruments, Nippon 
Electric Corporation (NEC), Toshiba, etc. European semiconductor companies are Philips or 
Siemens.  
 
                                                 
5
 Kumar and Krenner (2002), p. 229  
6
 Gruber (1999)  
7
 http://www.pctechguide.com/glossary/WordFind.php?wordInput=SRAM (2010-02-08)  
http://www.pctechguide.com/14Memory_L1_cache.htm (2010-02-08) 
8
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Static_random_access_memory (2010-02-08)  
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3.2 Description of the data set  
 
The data for 21 generations of SRAM chips stem from Gartner, Inc9. The observations are on 
a quarterly basis for the years 1974 to 2004 and cover data for SRAM chips from the 4KB 
generation to the 64MB generation. The data set includes industry-level data about units 
shipped, average selling prices and the number of firms producing particular SRAM 
generations. The price of silicon, which is the main cost factor in the production of SRAM 
chips, is compiled by Metall Bulletin Ltd10.  
 
For my analysis, I only chose the four SRAM generations (16KB, 64KB, 256KB and 1MB) 
with the most observations. These generations were on the market for a longer period of time 
in comparison to other generations, so there exist 64-91 observations for each of them. 
Estimation for generations with less than 60 observations may not be reasonable.  
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics, 1980-2004  
Variable 16K 64K 256K 1MB
Price
Mean 6.80 15.81 8.68 14.80
Std.Dev. 16.50 43.87 15.14 17.75
Median 2.74 2.71 4.48 13.58
Minimum 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.85
Maximum 124.49 245.72 87.78 81.48
Output
Sum 1,765,568 3,259,202 5,421,165 3,383,168
Mean 19,191 37,036 73,259 52,862
Std.Dev. 18,303 27,111 46,844 43,339
Median 12,566 32,753 70,165 48,060
Minimum 7 10 15 365
Maximum 59,254 84,998 190,930 133,630
Price of Silicon
Mean 1,679.30 1,551.49 1,481.45 1,379.02
Std.Dev. 588.75 536.54 556.16 527.12
Observations 91 88 74 64
 
Notes:  Prices are in constant US-Dollar. The data are from Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd.  
 
To give an overview of the data, Table 1 provides some summary statistics of industry prices 
and output and the price of silicon for the chosen SRAM generations. Comparing the 16KB, 
the 64KB, the 256KB and the 1MB generation I find out that the 64KB SRAM chip has the 
                                                 
9
 a consulting firm in Stamford, U.S.A. 
10
 a consulting firm in London, Great Britain  
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highest price on average (15.81 $), whereas the 16KB chip has the lowest average price 
(6.80 $). Every quarter 73,259 units of the 256KB generation were sold on average. On the 
other side there is the lowest average number of 19,191 units shipped of the 16KB 
generation. The highest number of sold units (190,930) was reached by the 256KB 
generation in the last quarter of 1995. Until 2004, the most successful generation was the 
256KB generation; from 1985 to 2004 5,421,165 units of chips were sold. The price of silicon 
per kilogram is decreasing with every new generation; an average price of 1,679.30 $ for the 
16KB generation falls to 1,379.02 $ for the 1MB generation. There should also be mentioned, 
that the product life cycles of the 64KB, the 256KB and the 1MB generation have not ended 
in 2004 and that, unfortunately, the number of observations for the four chosen generations 
is still relatively small.  
 
Figure 2 states the prices of the four SRAM generations between 1980 and 2004. What 
stands out immediately is, that for each generation prices fall extremely only shortly after the 
introduction on the market. The reasons are, that firms learn very quickly and more and more 
companies enter the market. For example, the average selling price of the 64KB generation 
dropped by nearly 60 % within the first year, the price of the 256KB generation by almost 
70 % and the 16KB generation faces a price decline of roughly 80 % within the first 12 
months. I found it also interesting to remark that the 64KB generation has a significantly 
higher introduction price than the other generations.  
 
Figure 2:  Average selling prices in US-Dollar, 1980-2004 
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Notes:  Prices are in constant US-Dollar. The dataset is from Gartner, Inc.  
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Figure 3 shows the number of units sold between 1980 and 2004. It is a fact that the life 
cylces of different generations are in a way similar and that different generations overlap. 
Each starts with a very small output since only one firm has introduced the particular SRAM 
generation. A peak is reached relatively soon (compared with other products)11. One can 
observe that some generations have a second peak a few years after the first. It is also 
noticeable that in 1999 the number of sold units goes down for the 64KB, the 256KB and the 
1MB SRAM chip.  
 
Figure 3:  Number of sold units, 1980-2004 
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Notes:  Prices are in constant US-Dollar. The dataset is from Gartner, Inc.  
 
Figure 4:  Price of silicon per kilogram in US-Dollar, 1980-2004 
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Notes:  Prices are in constant US-Dollar. The dataset is from Metall Bulletin Ltd.  
                                                 
11
 Irwin and Klenow (1994)  
  21 
 
The price of silicon per kilogram (relative to the consumer price index) is decreasing in the 
long-run, as displayed in Figure 4 (only the years 1980 to 2004 are shown, that correspond 
to the four chosen SRAM generations). The highest price was 3419.97 $ and was reached in 
the first quarter of 1980. The lowest was 671.61 $, at the end of 1996, which was caused by 
a remarkable price fall after an increase in the price of silicon from 1994 on.  
 
Figure 5:  Average selling prices per KB in US-Dollar, 1980-2004 
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Notes:  Prices are in constant US-Dollar. The dataset is from Gartner, Inc.  
 
I also calculated a price index (Figure 5) for each generation at each point in time, which 
represents the price per KB and is given by a itit
i
pPI
KB
= , where pit is the price of the SRAM 
chip of generation i at time t and KBi is the number of kilobyte, that a chip of generation i can 
store. The pattern of these curves is similar to those of the absolute price, but for the 256KB 
and the 1MB generation the “start point” is already relatively low in comparison to the 
absolute introduction price. It can be observed that the index decreases steadily for each 
generation with just a few fluctuations. The maximum of this price index is 7.78 $ and refers 
to the 16KB SRAM chip in the first quarter of 1980, whereas the minimum is 0.085 $-Cent 
and relates to the 1MB chip at the end of 2003. So one can assume a further fall in the price 
index. If the view is broadened and also other generations are considered, I found out that 
the index for the 64MB chip is with 0.008 $-Cent at the end of 2003 even lower.  
 
I assume that one or only a few firms start producing a new generation of SRAM chips, but 
other firms are following very quickly; and the data shows that this assumption is right (Figure 
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6). Within a short period of time a peak of roughly 30 firms is reached and the number of 
firms declines nearly as rapidely as it rose.  
 
Figure 6:  Number of firms in the SRAM industry, 1980-2004 
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Notes:  The dataset is from Gartner, Inc.  
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4 The model  
 
 
The model I use in my diploma thesis determines market price and quantity by the 
intersection of a demand function and a supply relation.12 
 
In this chapter I present the demand model and the supply model, the theoretical aspects 
and the econometric implementation. At the end of this part, I describe the Instrumental 
Variable and the Two Stages Least Squares estimation method, which I will apply on the 
model in chapter 5.  
 
Genesove and Mullin (1998) – as mentioned before –  engage in the sugar industry, where 
they set up the marginal cost function of refining sugar 
 
0 RAWc c k p= + ×   (1) 
 
where c stands for the marginal cost of producing 100 pounds of refined sugar, c0 are all 
variable costs other than the cost of raw sugar itself, pRAW represents the price for raw sugar, 
and k is the (fixed) parameter, that explains, how many pounds of raw sugar are needed for 
the production of one pound of refined sugar. The authors get a precise estimate for k 
(k=1.075) by working out that only 96 % of raw sugar are sucrose and that there is also some 
loss of sugar in the refining process. As a measure for c0 they use 26 ¢ per hundred pounds, 
which is made up of taxes, packages, wages, fuel, etc and reduced by the value of by-
products such as syrup. With this information they derive the conduct parameter θ, which is 
equal to the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, Lη:  
 
( ) P cP L
P η
θ η −= ≡  (2) 
 
where η(P) represents the demand elasticity. Comparing the derived θ with their estimated ˆθ  
they conclude that the method performs reasonably well. In the following I will describe my 
modification of this model.  
 
                                                 
12
 “Supply functions” are only defined in a perfectly competitve market. Therefore the literature uses 
the term “supply relations” for industries, where firms have some market power.  
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4.1 Demand model  
 
Generally, the demand function takes the form  
 
( )Q P γβ α= −  (3) 
 
where Q is the quantity of SRAM chips demanded, P is the price of one unit of an SRAM 
chip, β is a measure for the size of market demand, γ is an index of convexity and α stands 
for the maximum willingness to pay (when γ is positive).  
 
In the rest of the paper I will specialize in the linear demand function (where γ = 1), which 
looks as follows:  
 
( ) dQ Pβ α ε= − +  (4) 
 
Here, εd represents the error term of the demand function and includes proportional shifts in 
demand.  
 
In my work on the SRAM industry I estimate the linear demand equation  
 
0 1t t dtoutput pricecα α ε= + +   (5) 
 
for t = 1, ..., T, where α0 and α1 are the parameters to be estimated, pricect is the average 
selling price of an SRAM chip at time t, outputt are the chips sold at time t. 
 
The analysis of the estimated parameters should give a negative sign for 1αˆ , which 
represents the marginal effect of pricec on output. Comparing with equation (4) one 
recognizes that 0 ˆˆ ˆα βα=  and 1 ˆαˆ β= − , which leads me to 0
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
α
α
α
= − . αˆ  is required for 
estimating the pricing rule later on.  
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4.2 Supply model  
 
The SRAM market is an oligopoly with a few firms producing these chips, as Figure 6 proved. 
Each firm should have some market power, so that it could raise the price for an SRAM chip 
above its marginal cost. To which extent a single firm may do this depends on how much its 
market power is limited by supply side substitution and/or demand side substitution. Supply 
side substitution explains the fact, that there are other suppliers who produce the same good. 
This description applies to the SRAM industry since the chips are homogenous and 
produced by a few firms. Demand side substitution means that consumers may switch to 
other products if they see them as acceptable substitutes. In the SRAM industry SRAM chips 
of other generations or even DRAM chips may be used as substitutes, respectively.  
 
My aim in this part of my thesis is to get an equation that shows how price depends on 
(marginal) cost. Therefore, I maximize the profit function of a firm i with respect to Qi13: 
 
max ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i iQ
Q R Q C Qpi = −  (6) 
 
where R(Qi) is the revenue function and Ci(Qi) the cost function for firm i, and get as a result 
 
( *) ( *)i i iMR Q c Q=  (7) 
 
where MR(Qi*) and ci(Qi*) are marginal revenue and marginal cost at the profit-maximizing 
output level for firm i Qi*, respectively. 
 
If the firm is operating under perfect competition, it acts as a price taker and has therefore 
the revenue function 
 
( )i iR Q PQ=  (8) 
 
Thus, MR(qi)=P. Substituting this into (7) leads me to the profit-maximizing rule for a firm in a 
perfectly competitive market  
 
( )i iP c Q=  (9) 
                                                 
13
 For simplicity, I omit here and in following equations other variables that may influence the revenue 
or the cost function and therefore the profit.  
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On the other hand side, if the firm is a monopolist or some firms form a cartel, it/they can set 
the price herself/themselves and changes in the price P lead to changes in units sold Qi. The 
sum of the units sold of each firm gives a total output 
1
n
i
i
Q Q
=
= ∑  for n firms in the market. I 
insert the new revenue function R(Qi)=P(Q)Qi into the the profit function and the 
maximization problem is now 
 
max ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i iQ
Q P Q Q C Qpi = −  (10) 
 
The first difference gives  
 
( )( ) ( ) 0i i iP QP Q Q c QQ
∂
+ − =
∂
 (11) 
 
Thus, the profit-maximizing condition for a monopolist or a firm in a cartel turns out to be  
 
( )( ) ( )i i iP QP Q Q c QQ
∂
+ =
∂
 (12) 
 
Comparing the conditions for markets characterized by perfect competition – (9) – and by 
monopoly/cartel – (12) –, one can write a general supply relation:14  
 
( )( ) ( )i i iP QP Q Q c QQθ
∂
+ =
∂
 (13) 
 
where θ is a parameter indexing the competitiveness of industry conduct, θ = 0 indicates 
perfect competition, from θ = 1 I conclude that the industry is a monopoly or perfect cartel, 
and θ between 0 and 1 describes another oligopoly solution – for example θ = 1/n for 
Cournot equilibrium (where n is the number of firms in the industry). θ is taken to be constant 
over time and equal for all firms in the market. Thus, the parameter can be interpreted as 
average conduct in the industry.15  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Church and Ware (2000)  
15
 Cowling and Waterson (1976)  
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From equations (13) and (3) the pricing rule  
 
( ) cP c θα γ
γ θ
+
=
+
 (14)  
 
is derived (see Appendix). Since I specialize in the linear demand function (where γ = 1), the 
pricing rule can be written as  
 
( )
1
cP c θα
θ
+
=
+
  (15)  
 
Genesove and Mullin (1998) specify the linear marginal cost function mentioned in (1). Their 
pricing rule looks as follows:  
 
0( )
1
RAWc k pP c θα
θ
+ + ×
=
+
 (16)  
 
In my model, pRAW is replaced by sil1c, which is the main cost factor in the production of 
memory chips. Thus, I set up the following marginal cost (MC) functions, which I will make 
use of in the course of this paper:  
 
(c1)  0c c k sil1c= + ×   
(c2)  0c c k sil1c j output= + × + ×   
(c3)  0c c k sil1c m outputcum_1= + × + ×   
(c4)  0c c k sil1c j output m outputcum_1= + × + × + ×    
(c5)  0exp( )c c k sil1c= + ×   
(c6)  0exp( )c c k sil1c j output= + × + ×  (17) 
(c7)  0exp( )c c k sil1c m outputcum_1= + × + ×   
(c8)  0exp( )c c k sil1c j output m outputcum_1= + × + × + ×   
(c9) 20( )c c k sil1c= + ×   
(c10) 20( )c c k sil1c j output= + × + ×   
(c11) 20( )c c k sil1c m outputcum_1= + × + ×   
(c12) 20( )c c k sil1c j output m outputcum_1= + × + × + ×   
 
  28 
where functions (c1) – (c4) are linear, (c5) – (c8) are exponential and (c9) – (c12) are 
quadratic MC functions. I made use of exponential and quadratic MC functions, because I 
thought they would represent the shape of the true MC curve better. Equations (c2), (c6), 
(c10) include output and functions (c3), (c7), (c11) outputcum_1 (which is output 
accumulated until t-1) as factors that influence marginal cost. In (c4), (c8) and (c12) both 
output and outputcum_1 are used. The variable output may influence marginal cost, since 
the more is produced the lower the costs for an additional SRAM chip are. The impact of 
lagged accumulated output outputcum_1 on MC has to do with learning-by-doing. More 
cumulative output means more production experience. Thus, precision in production can be 
improved, the percentage of defective chips is minimized and costs for producing one 
additional unit decrease. 16  
 
Substituting the particular marginal cost function – from (c1) to (c12) – in (15) yields the 
pricing rules for estimation:  
 
(P1)  0ˆ
1 1 1t t t st
c kpricec sil1cθ α ε
θ θ θ
= + + +
+ + +
  
(P2)  0ˆ
1 1 1 1t t t t st
c k jpricec sil1c outputθ α ε
θ θ θ θ
= + + + +
+ + + +
  
(P3)  0ˆ
1 1 1 1t t t t st
c k mpricec sil1c outputcum_1θ α ε
θ θ θ θ
= + + + +
+ + + +
  
(P4)  0ˆ
1 1 1 1 1t t t t t
c k j mpricec sil1c output outputcum_1θ α ε
θ θ θ θ θ
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
  
(P5)  0exp( )ˆ
1 1
t
t t st
c k sil1cpricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ ×
= + +
+ +
   
(P6) 0exp( )ˆ
1 1
t t
t t st
c k sil1c j outputpricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ × + ×
= + +
+ +
 (18) 
(P7) 0exp( )ˆ
1 1
t t
t t st
c k sil1c m outputcum_1pricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ × + ×
= + +
+ +
  
(P8) 0exp( )ˆ
1 1
t t t
t t st
c k sil1c j output m outputcum_1pricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ × + × + ×
= + +
+ +
   
(P9)  
2
0( )
ˆ
1 1
t
t t st
c k sil1cpricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ ×
= + +
+ +
  
(P10) 
2
0( )
ˆ
1 1
t t
t t st
c k sil1c j outputpricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ × + ×
= + +
+ +
  
                                                 
16
 Irwin and Klenow (1994)  
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(P11) 
2
0( )
ˆ
1 1
t t
t t st
c k sil1c m outputcum_1pricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ × + ×
= + +
+ +
  
(P12) 
2
0( )
ˆ
1 1
t t t
t t st
c k sil1c j output m outputcum_1pricec θ α ε
θ θ
+ × + × + ×
= + +
+ +
  
 
for t = 1, ..., T, where θ, c0, k, j and m are the parameters to be estimated, pricect is the 
average selling price of an SRAM chip at time t, ˆtα  is the parameter at time t, which I get by 
estimating the demand function (5), sil1ct is the price of silicon at time t, outputt is the number 
of sold SRAM chips at time t, outputcum_1t is output accumulated until time t-1 and εst 
represents the error term of the supply relation at time t.  
 
For the estimated ˆθ  I expect a value between 0 and 1, 0cˆ  and ˆk  should have a positive 
sign and ˆj  and mˆ  are supposed to have a negative influence on marginal cost and, as a 
consequence, on price.  
 
To answer my second question, I calculate the Lerner index, which is a measure of market 
power, as one can find out from (2). Another method to calculate this index is  
 
1
( )L P nofη η= ×  (19) 
 
where ( )Pη  is the price elasticity of demand and nof is the number of firms in the industry for 
each particular generation. High values of the Lerner index are an indicator for high market 
power of the firms.  
 
 
 
4.3 Estimation Method17  
 
For estimating the demand function I use two-stage least square estimation (2SLS). In the 
following I will explain the instrumental variable (IV) estimation method, which can be seen 
as the base of 2SLS, and, of course, the 2SLS estimation method.  
 
 
                                                 
17
 cf. Wooldridge (2005), p. 510ff.  
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4.3.1 Instrumental variable estimation 
 
Instrumental variable estimation is a method that can be used if assumption MLR.4 – 
according to Wooldridge (2005) – of the OLS model is violated. This assumption says that  
 
„[T]he error u has an expected value of zero given any values of the independent 
variables. In other words,  
 
1 2( | , ,..., ) 0kE u x x x = “.18 (20) 
 
This implies that the model looks as follows:  
 
0 1 1 ... ,k ky x x uβ β β= + + + +  (21) 
 
where y is the dependent variable, xi are the explanatory variables, βi are the unknown 
parameters and u is the error term (i=1,...,k).  
 
The above mentioned assumption may not be fulfilled if there is an unobserved variable in 
the error term u (unobserved heterogeneity), such that e.g. the explanatory variable x1 is 
correlated with u, (i.e. E(u|x1) ≠ 0). As a consequence all of the estimators would be biased 
and inconsistent if I would estimate (21) by OLS. One could deal with this problem by 
replacing the unobserved variable with a proxy variable, but it may be not easy or even 
impossible to find a suitable one.  
 
The instrumental variable estimation technique is another approach. It searches for an 
instrument z1, that is,  
 
(i) uncorrelated with u, i.e. E(u|z1) = 0; and  
(ii) correlated with x1, i.e. Cov(z1,x1) ≠ 0.  
 
The first condition states that z1 has to be exogenous. It can only be effectively tested if there 
is more than one instrumental variable. The second condition means that z1 and x1 must be 
(positively or negatively) linked to each other. This assumption can be tested by estimating 
the linear function  
 
                                                 
18
 Wooldridge (2005), p. 87  
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1 0 1 1 2 2 1... k kx z x x vpi pi pi pi= + + + + +  (22) 
 
which consists of the endogenous explanatory variable x1 on the left-hand side and the 
exogenous variables and an error term on the right-hand side; πj are unknown parameters.  
 
Therefore, the required condition to ratify that z1 and x1 are correlated is that 
 
1 0pi ≠ .   (23) 
 
So, equation (22) is estimated by OLS and a t-test that should reject the null hypothesis 
 
0 1: 0H pi =   (24) 
 
against the alternative hypothesis  
 
1: 0AH pi ≠  (25) 
 
is carried out.  
 
Thus, if the conditions (i) and (ii) are true, z1 is a valid instrumental variable for x1.  
 
 
4.3.2 Two stage least squares estimation 
 
Two stage least squares estimation is similar to instrumental variable estimation. The main 
difference is simply, that there can be more than one instrumental variable for the 
endogenous explanatory variable x1; but also, that there exists more than one endogenous 
explanatory variable.  
 
Let me consider firstly the case, where there is only one endogenous explanatory variable x1 
but more than one instrumental variable. The model looks as in equation (21), but now there 
is more than one exogenous variable excluded from it (here named zl, l = 1, ... m). Clearly, 
these variables are uncorrelated with the error term u. Hence, any linear combination of all 
exogenous variables is also uncorrelated with u and can therefore be a valid instrument for 
x1. To get the linear combination that is most highly correlated with x1, the reduced form 
equation for x1 is estimated:  
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1 0 1 1 1 2 1 2... ...m m m m k kx z z x x vpi pi pi pi pi+ + −= + + + + + + +   (26) 
 
Now, an F-test, where I test the null hypothesis  
 
0 2 3: 0H pi pi= =   (27) 
 
against the alternative hypothesis  
 
2 3: 0 or 0AH pi pi≠ ≠ ,  (28) 
 
can be used to check, if the linear combination 
 
1 0 1 1 1 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ... ˆ ˆ ... ˆm m m m k kx z z x xpi pi pi pi pi+ + −= + + + + + +  (29) 
 
is a proper instrumental variable for x1.  
 
Thus, the two stage least squares estimation method has two steps: In the first stage, 
equation (29) has to be estimated, where the fitted values 1xˆ  are obtained which have to 
serve as the instrument. In the second stage, I regress y on 1xˆ  and z1 by OLS.  
 
Now, I assume that there is not only one, but there are multiple endogenous explanatory 
variables. To estimate (21) I need at least as many exogenous variables, that are not 
included in (21), as endogenous explanatory variables. This (necessary) condition is called 
the order condition and easy to check. The rank condition is not as easy to verify, but 
sufficient for identification.  
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5 Results  
 
 
The equation system, which consists of the demand equation (5) and the particular pricing 
rule – from (P1) to (P12) –, is now estimated, using the data described in chapter 3.2. Since 
for some SRAM generations there are relatively few data points, I select only four 
generations, namely the 16KB, the 64KB, the 256KB and the 1MB generation, for estimation.  
 
 
5.1 Demand side  
 
The demand equation given in (5) has to be estimated using 2SLS. The two stages least 
squares estimation method is necessary, because both variables output and pricec are 
assumed to be endogenous, so they are correlated with the error term εdt . That means for 
pricec that it is correlated with an unobserved variable included in the error term. Since using 
2SLS is less efficient than OLS if all explanatory variables are exogenous, I have to make 
sure, that pricec is really endogenous. This can be checked by using the Hausman (1978) 
test, which compares the OLS and 2SLS estimates to find out whether the differences are 
statistically significant. If this is the case, pricec must be endogenous.  
 
Table 2:  Hausman (1978) test - chi-square statistic 
1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter
16KB 2.76 3.28 3.64 1.74
64KB 4.79 ** 4.69 ** 4.35 ** 3.86 **
256KB 3.29 * 1.90 3.66 * 3.60 *
1MB 4.98 ** 5.00 ** 5.16 ** 4.20 **
H0: difference in coeff icients is not systematic 
HA: dif ference in coeff icients is systematic
 
Notes:  */**/*** indicate, that the result is significant at a 90-/95-/99-%-level. The data are from 
Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd.  
 
From Table 2, which shows the results of the Hausman test, I can conclude that pricec is 
endogenous. Since most of the chi-square statistics of the different generations and quarters 
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indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected, it is reasonable to use the 2SLS estimation 
method.  
 
When a demand function is estimated, the unobserved variable indicates shocks on the 
supply side. Thus, the estimates would be biased and inconsistent if I would use OLS, so I 
search for at least one instrument that is exogenous and correlated with pricec. Instruments 
for shocks on the supply side can be, for example, input prices, the number of firms in the 
market, lagged prices or world prices (if only a small market is examined, that could not 
influence the world prices). In my work, I use the price of silicon, sil1c, and the number of 
firms in the SRAM market, nof, as instruments for pricec. To justify this decision, an F-test, 
which checks for the joint significance of the instruments, is necessary (as described in 
chapter 4.3 – equations (26) to (28) have to be considered). By applying this test on the first 
stage of regression, I obtain F-statistics that support my choice of instruments, since the p-
values are all below 0.01.  
 
Table 3 presents the first stage of the estimation results of the demand equation. The 
important point in this table is that the variables (instruments) are jointly significant (as 
discussed above) and that R² has a high value. R² has good values for the 16KB and the 
1MB generation (between 0.72 and 0.82), is acceptable for the 256KB generation (values 
between 0.54 and 0.71), but is relatively low for the 64KB generation (values between 0.38 
and 0.51). This means that for the 16KB and the 1MB generation up to 82 % of the variation 
of pricec in the sample is explained by the given explanatory variables, whereas for the 64KB 
generation only up to 51 % of the variation of pricec is explained.  
 
The coefficients of the first stage show, what I expected in advance: The coefficient of nof is 
negative, since more firms in the industry lead to more competition, price wars and thus, 
lower prices. The effect is highest in the first quarter of the 64KB generation, where one 
additional firm in the market lets the price decrease by 3.83 $; the lowest coefficient is found 
in the fourth quarter of the 16KB generation, with a price fall of 0.67 $ if another firm enters 
the market. The coefficient of sil1c gives a positive sign. Clearly, a rise of an input price 
causes the price of an SRAM chip to increase. There is hardly a difference between the 
coefficients of the different generations. For the 256KB and the 1MB generation it ranges 
between 0.01 and 0.02, which means that a 1 $ increase in the price of silicon raises the 
price of an SRAM chip by 0.01 $ or 0.02 $, respectively. The effect for the 16KB generation 
lies between 0.01 in the third and fourth quarter and 0.04 in the first quarter. For the 64KB 
generation the coefficient is with 0.05 in the first quarter the highest one in the sample.  
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Table 3: Demand for SRAM chips: Estimation results of the first stage, 
separately by generation and quarter 
Explanatory 
variables 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter
16KB
0.19 -0.05 -0.11 -0.11
(0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08)
-1.62 -1.17 -0.89 -0.67
(0.29) (0.20) (0.17) (0.13)
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
-53.93 -10.09 3.70 8.27
(27.50) (17.42) (13.88) (10.88)
R² 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.72
64KB
-3.83 -3.28 -2.74 -2.12
(0.93) (0.81) (0.78) (0.67)
0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
21.23 18.36 17.69 19.44
(29.47) (24.22) (23.36) (19.18)
R² 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.38
256KB
-1.21 -0.81 -1.73 -1.26
(0.34) (0.19) (0.43) (0.38)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
18.73 11.09 30.70 23.44
(10.74) (5.76) (13.96) (12.49)
R² 0.61 0.71 0.60 0.54
1MB
-1.40 -1.62 -1.43 -0.88
(0.40) (0.39) (0.33) (0.32)
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
15.79 23.81 20.10 10.29
(13.84) (12.88) (10.75) (10.64)
R² 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82
nof
sil1c
Intercept
Intercept
nof
sil1c
Intercept
sil1c
Intercept
nof
sil1c
Dependent variable: pricec
time1
nof
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. The regression of the 16KB generation includes a time 
trend, otherwise the coefficients would be insignificant in the second stage. The data are from 
Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd.  
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Table 4: Demand for SRAM chips: Estimation results of the second stage, 
separately by generation and quarter 
Explanatory 
variable 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter
16KB
-919 -547 -1001 -1625 -2168
(290) (222) (393) (653) (785)
-588 -519 -613 -705 -737
(65) (134) (121) (115) (119)
67046 59926 69112 78938 83220
(6311) (12442) (11445) (11148) (12013)
64KB
-659 -516 -644 -741 -896
(182) (262) (348) (435) (527)
47459 47634 47537 47749 47700
(3155) (6330) (6715) (6682) (6394)
256KB
-2864 -2891 -3712 -2258 -3050
(709) (1328) (1288) (1089) (1544)
98134 98448 99882 95670 99892
(5881) (11547) (12104) (11319) (12968)
1MB
-2348 -2078 -2134 -2443 -2981
(402) (738) (767) (852) (818)
87611 85916 84683 89385 91996
(5703) (12097) (11199) (12025) (11631)
Dependent variable: output
pricec
pricec
Intercept
pricec
Intercept
pricec
Intercept
time1 
Intercept
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses and heteroskedasticity-robust. The regression of the 16KB 
generation includes a time trend, otherwise the variables would be insignificant. The data are 
from Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd.  
 
Table 4 reports the demand estimates, separately by generation and quarter. The table 
states the coefficients and their standard errors, which are heteroskedasticity-robust. As 
expected, the demand curve is downward sloping in all quarters and generations. The time 
trend for the 16KB generation is negative, which is reasonable since it indicates a price fall 
over time. pricec has the highest coefficient in the 256KB generation: -2864.12 means that a 
price increase of 1 $ leads to a decrease in units sold of 2864.12 units on average. The 
coefficient is even higher in the second quarter of the 256KB generation (-3712.07). On the 
other hand side, a price increase of 1 $ causes only a decrease of 659.42 units of output in 
the 64KB generation on average. I found the lowest coefficient in the first quarter of the 64KB 
generation (-516.01). Another fact that seems interesting is, that – except for the 256KB 
generation – the coefficients rise (in absolute values) from quarter to quarter. Thus, in the 
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fourth quarter output reacts mostly more sensitive in an increase of the price of an SRAM 
chip than in other parts of the year.  
 
 
 
5.2 Supply side  
 
As described in the previous chapters, I can now generate αˆ  from the coefficient of pricec 
and the intercept of demand equation (5) ( 0
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
α
α
α
= − ). Now I am able to estimate the pricing 
rules (P1) to (P12) as mentioned in (18).  
 
Column (1) of Table 5 presents the results of estimating (P1), but they differ to some extent 
from what I expected. ˆθ  takes on values between 0.034 and 0.039 for the 16KB and 1MB 
generation on the one hand, but values between 0.22 and 0.245 for the 64KB and 256KB 
generation on the other hand. It seems that for the 16KB and 1MB generation the market is 
more competitive, whereas the sale of the 64KB and 256KB generation takes place in an 
oligopoly market. However, I have serious doubts about the accuracy of these outcomes, 
since the estimated parameter 0cˆ  is negative for all four generations.  
 
Changing the marginal cost function may solve this problem. Until now, I assumed that 
marginal costs have a linear shape, so that the appropriate specification is (c1). In the 
following I will make use of other marginal cost functions (c2) to (c12) – as mentioned in (17) 
– to get reasonable results.  
 
The analysis of Table 5 shows, that the coefficients of columns (1) to (4), that correspond to 
the linear MC specification, give no acceptable results. The problem is either, that the 
estimates for θ  are negative (θ  is a parameter for market conduct and should lie between 0 
and 1), or, that the regression produces values below 0 for the fixed factor of MC 0cˆ . The 
outcomes of the quadratic MC functions – columns (9) to (12) – are also not satisfying, since 
most of the coefficients again have the wrong sign or are insignificant, respectively. 
Adequate results can only be found for the 64KB and the 256KB generation. Columns (6) to 
(8), which refer to the exponential MC specification, give reasonable and significant results 
for the 64KB generation. The coefficients of the exponential MC function including output – 
column (6) – have also the right signs, but 0cˆ  is insignificant. Nevertheless, I will use the MC 
specification (c6) for further analysis of the 64KB and the 256KB SRAM chip.  
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Table 5: Pricing Rule for SRAM chips - Estimated Parameters 
Dependent variable: pricec
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
16KB
0.039 0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.010 0.020 0.015 -0.057 -0.006 -0.042 -0.006
(0.058) (0.044) (0.035) (0.027) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
-22.758 -23.746 2.455 0.566 -2.049 -0.737 -1.144 -0.815 -6.769 -5.763 -3.779 -3.439
(6.420) (5.001) (6.334) (4.857) (0.278) (0.174) (0.140) (0.158) (0.280) (0.294) (0.574) (0.455)
0.016 0.024 0.006 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
64KB
0.220 0.177 -0.017 -0.030 -0.026 0.053 0.061 0.055 0.013 -0.107 -0.137 -0.096
(0.478) (0.387) (0.233) (0.216) (0.286) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.304) (0.049) (0.051) (0.044)
-31.228 -15.598 116.336 77.320 1.426 2.233 1.643 1.758 0.180 1.928 -23.940 14.767
(42.733) (31.339) (29.835) (28.519) (3.121) (0.266) (0.534) (0.414) (6.955) (1.577) (2.043) (2.946)
0.023 0.037 -0.038 -0.012 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.008 -0.003
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
256KB
0.245 0.230 -0.068 -0.055 -0.051 0.164 0.090 0.071 0.036 0.001 -0.029 -0.048
(0.438) (0.386) (0.189) (0.177) (0.169) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.086) (0.049) (0.048) (0.041)
-21.405 -4.048 13.530 16.772 0.110 1.253 14.896 12.830 -2.339 3.496 3.882 12.175
(20.285) (13.567) (11.142) (10.104) (2.129) (1.726) (1.278) (1.342) (2.793) (1.104) (2.380) (1.746)
0.016 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.003
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1MB
0.034 0.080 -0.116 -0.081 0.080 0.081 0.091 0.090 0.025 -0.060 -0.046 -0.027
(0.385) (0.415) (0.251) (0.265) (0.055) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.046) (0.031) (0.048) (0.028)
-23.025 -13.058 -14.471 -4.436 -2.720 -1.146 -1.621 -1.451 -5.984 -2.791 -1.808 -2.795
(22.369) (20.282) (15.959) (14.711) (0.816) (0.335) (0.396) (0.531) (0.934) (0.725) (1.151) (0.810)
0.027 0.022 0.022 0.018 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
linear MC function exponential MC function quadratic MC function
ˆj
mˆ
ˆk
0cˆ
ˆθ
ˆj
mˆ
ˆk
0cˆ
ˆθ
ˆj
mˆ
ˆk
0cˆ
ˆθ
ˆj
mˆ
ˆk
0cˆ
ˆθ
 
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses. I included a time trend as an explanatory variable in the 
regressions of the 16KB generation, since the results would be insignificant otherwise. 
Column (1) refers to marginal cost function (c1), column (2) to MC function (c2) etc. The data 
are from Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd. 
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The estimates for θ  are 0.053 and 0.164 for the two mentioned generations, respectively, 
which means that the market for the 64KB SRAM chip is more competitive than the market 
for the 256KB chip. The Cournot solution is 1nofθ = , which implies for both generations an 
average value of roughly 0.05 (the number of firms ranges from 1 to 35 for the 64KB 
generation and from 3 to 32 for the 256KB generation). Thus, I conclude that the suppliers of 
the two observed SRAM generations are oligopolists and have still some market power to 
raise price above marginal costs. 0cˆ  takes on values of 2.233 and 1.253, respectively and ˆk  
values of 0.002 for both generations, which shows a positive impact of the price of silicon 
sil1c on the price of an SRAM chip. The number of units sold, output, has – as expected – a 
small negative effect on marginal costs and on the price.  
 
Figure 7: Comparison of Prices and Estimated Marginal Costs - according to 
specification (c6) - in US-Dollar for the SRAM generations 64KB and 
256KB, 1980-2004 
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Notes:  The data are from Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd. 
 
Figure 7 shows the results of column (6) of Table 5 graphically. Estimated marginal costs 
(MC) are compared with the price of an SRAM chip of the 64KB and the 256KB generation. 
Examining the shape of the estimated MC curves, one notices that they are (like the prices) 
very high when introducing the chip on the market. This fact is easy to explain, since many 
chips are defective in the beginning of the production process, but the percentage of useable 
chips increases little by little with production experience. After market launch, estimated MC 
exceed prices for one to two years. This situation is found in many industries, where 
  40 
learning-by-doing is present (like the SRAM industry), after the introduction on the market.19 
For the 64KB generation I found out, that from the end of 1983 on, MC fall below price and 
the estimated values are close to 0 until the end of 2002, where price is again lower than 
MC. The MC curve of the 256KB generation is above the price curve from mid 1985 to mid 
1986. From this time on, estimated MC decrease until they reach almost 0 and stay on such 
a low level for the whole observation period.  
 
Although the chosen MC curve lies above 0 in the whole time period (in contrast to other MC 
specification), I am not sure if I should trust these results. Analyzing the exact values of the 
estimated MC of the 256KB generation I found out that the curve lies on the 0-line from 1994 
to 1998. Thus, I think that my model doesn’t work well, since in reality, there exist at least 
very low costs for producing one additional unit of a memory chip. Furthermore, a reason, 
why the method works for two but not for all four selected generations, is not apparent to me.  
 
Figure 8: Comparison of Lerner Index and Price of an SRAM chip in the time 
period of 1980 to 2004 for the 16KB, 64KB, 256KB and 1MB generation  
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Notes:  Lerner Index restricted to ≥0. The data are from Gartner, Inc. and Metall Bulletin Ltd. 
 
Figure 8 tries to solve the second question of my thesis, which asks if market power is higher 
for higher prices. High prices of an SRAM chip are found mainly in the first year of the 
product life cycle. Figure 1 suggests, that higher prices are not only due to high prices of 
                                                 
19
 Zulehner (2003)  
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silicon, but that other factors have an impact on the price of an SRAM chip. Figure 8 supports 
this statement, since it shows that the Lerner index (an indicator for market power) is 
generally higher for the high prices at market launch of the different generations. Although 
the Lerner index for all generations (except for the 16KB SRAM) rises again slightly in the 
last observed years, Figure 8 indicates, that market power is highest in the year after the 
introduction of an SRAM chip on the market (when prices are very high) and thus, prices can 
in this time period be raised above MC. Unfortunately, this is the opposite of what Figure 7 
suggests, where MC exceed prices in the first periods of the life cycle. Since evidence in 
industries, where learning-by-doing is an issue, shows, that MC are often higher than prices 
in the introduction phase, I am not sure in which outcome to believe.  
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6 Conclusion  
 
 
The SRAM (Static Random Access Memory) industry is, like the semiconductor industry in 
common, a quite young industry. SRAM chips are not as often used as DRAM chips. The 
product life cycle of memory chips is relatively short. Since the number of transistors per 
wafer is increased steadily, new generations are invented within short periods of time. These 
are all reasons for few observations per SRAM generation. In my work, I chose to analyze 
the four most successful generations – which had the most observations over time – from 21 
available generations. The selected generations – 16KB, 64KB, 256KB and 1MB – had 91, 
88, 74 and 64 observations, respectively.  
 
The goal of my diploma thesis is to get estimates for demand, marginal cost and market 
conduct, although I only have data for price and sold units of SRAM chips, price of silicon 
(the main cost factor in the production of semiconductors) and the number of firms in the 
SRAM industry at my disposal. In the course of the paper, I described these chosen data 
sets and set up a model, that consists of a simple linear demand function and a supply 
relation and is based on the NEIO (New Empirical Industrial Organization) approch and 
particularly, on the model of Genesove and Mullin (1998).  
 
The supply relation contains a parameter for market conduct, θ, and a marginal cost function 
c. θ should take on values between 0 and 1, where 0 stands for a market with perfect 
competition, 1 for a monopoly or cartel situation in the industry and a value in between for an 
oligopoly situation on the market. The demand function has to be estimated using the 2SLS 
(two stages least squares) estimation method, because the variables pricec and output are 
assumed to be both endogenous and thus, correlated with the error term. A Hausman (1978) 
test verifies this decision. As assumed, a higher price leads to fewer units of SRAM chips 
being sold. This effect is highest for the 256KB generation and lowest for the 64KB 
generation.  
 
Since estimation with a linear marginal cost funcion doesn’t produce any reasonable results, 
I tried a few other marginal cost specifications (exponential or quadratic form, including 
output and/or lagged cumulative output) to solve the first question of my diploma thesis. The 
results were satisfying only for the 64KB and the 256KB generation and the exponential 
specification. The other outcomes were unrealistic because of the wrong signs of the 
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coefficients. According to my model, the market for the 64KB SRAM chip is more competitive 
than for the 256KB chip. Suppliers of both generations may operate in an oligopolistic 
market, so they have some market power to raise price above marginal costs. Thus, in the 
early periods of the product life cycle marginal costs exceed prices. After one to two years 
until the end of the observation period marginal costs are very close to 0 and below prices.  
 
Nevertheless, I am not sure if I should rely on these results. The model gives useable results 
only for two of the selected four generations, so it cannot be adapted to the whole SRAM 
industry. I tried different marginal cost functions to meet the shape of the true marginal cost 
curve and added different factors which may have an impact on marginal costs. For another 
estimation (that is not displayed in this paper) I used the price per KB instead of the absolute 
price together with the constructed marginal cost functions. But all the outcomes were not 
satisfying.  
 
The reasons why the model is not able to produce reasonable results for all generations can 
hardly be explained. The main problem may be that there do not exist enough observations 
for the chosen generations. Another factor to mention is, that for the 64KB, the 256KB and 
the 1MB generation the product life cycle has not ended in 2004, but data was not available 
for the years after. Furthermore, the extreme price fall in the first year after introduction may 
have distorted the results, since in my model price-cost margins (and thus market conduct) of 
each generation are assumed to be constant in the whole observation period. In reality, there 
may be changes in competition throughout the product life cycle. Probably, I would also have 
to take other factors into account, which may influence marginal costs but were not 
considered in my thesis. Therefore, the marginal cost function and – as a consequence – the 
pricing rule may not fit to the real situation in the SRAM industry.  
 
The second point of my thesis deals with the question, if market power is higher in the early 
periods of the product life cycle. Unfortunately, a concrete answer to this question cannot be 
given. The calculation of the Lerner index gives high values for high prices of SRAM chips, 
which are prevalent in the first year of the life cycle of a chip. This indicates, that market 
conduct is more likely a collusive oligopoly in the beginning of the life cycle of an SRAM 
generation than one or two years after, and firms can raise prices above marginal costs. The 
estimation of the chosen pricing rule tells the opposite (as mentioned above): marginal costs 
exceed prices in the first time of the product life cycle. Thus, further research can be done on 
this topic to find out how SRAM producing firms behave.  
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Summarizing my diploma thesis, I can say that the problem of identifying price-cost-margins 
in the SRAM industry is not yet solved. Although I was able to produce estimates of market 
conduct and marginal costs for the 64KB and the 256KB generation of SRAM chips, I have to 
put these results in question, since the model in this form cannot be adapted to other 
generations. Moreover, no concrete answer was found for the second question about higher 
market power in the first periods of the product life cycle of SRAM chips.  
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A Appendix  
 
 
A.1 Derivation of the pricing rule  
 
Given the general supply relation in (13) and the general demand function in (3), a pricing 
rule can be formed, which depends on marginal cost c, the conduct parameter θ, and the 
parameters of the demand function α and γ.  
 
Since I know that  
 
1( ) ( )P Q Q P
Q P
−∂ ∂ 
=  ∂ ∂ 
,  (30) 
 
I can differentiate the demand function (3) with respect to P and get  
 
( )
1
11( ) ( ) ( )P Q Q P PQ P
γγβ α
−
−
−
∂ ∂ 
= = − − ∂ ∂ 
 (31) 
 
which I plug together with the demand function (3) into the supply relation (13) to receive  
 
1
1( ) ( )P P cP
γ
γθβ α γβ α −− − =−  (32) 
 
(32) is now reduced to  
 
PP cαθ
γ
−
− =  (33) 
 
and formed to  
 
PP cθα θ
γ
−
− =  (34) 
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and  
 
PP cθ θα
γ γ
+ = +  (35) 
 
Another way to write this equation is  
 
1 cP θ θα γ
γ γ
  +
+ = 
 
 (36) 
 
So, finally I get the general pricing rule  
 
( ) cP c θα γ
γ θ
+
=
+
 (37) 
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A.2 List of abbreviations and variables  
 
DRAM  Dynamic Random Access Memory  
IV  Instrumental variable 
KB Kilobyte 
MB Megabyte  
MC Marginal cost 
NEIO New Empirical Industrial Organization  
SCPP  Structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
SRAM Static Random Access Memory 
2SLS  Two stages least squares 
 
pricec or P Price of an SRAM chip in constant US-Dollar 
output or Q  Sold units of SRAM chips 
sil1c  Price of silicon in constant US-Dollar  
nof Number of firms in the SRAM industry  
time1  Time trend  
outputcum_1  Sold units of SRAM chips accumulated until time t-1 
θ Parameter for market conduct  
c  Marginal cost function 
PI  Price index/price per KB in constant US-Dollar  
Lη Lerner index  
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A.5 Zusammenfassung  
 
Kosten-Preis-Spannen sind im Allgemeinen nicht messbar, da Unternehmen keine Daten 
über Grenzkosten preisgeben. Die „New Empirical Industrial Organization“ (NEIO) Methode 
versucht, diese Kosten und auch das Marktverhalten eines Unternehmens zu schätzen. 
Auch die vorliegende Diplomarbeit baut auf diesem Ansatz auf und konzentriert sich dabei 
auf die Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Industrie. Die Daten dafür stammen von 
Gartner, Inc, der Silizium-Preis (Hauptkostenfaktor bei der Produktion von Halbleitern) von 
Metall Bulletin Ltd. Die Analyse findet auf der Industrie-weiten Ebene statt, die Ergebnisse 
müssen deshalb als Durchschnitt aller Unternehmen gesehen werden.  
 
Die Fragen, die in dieser Arbeit untersucht werden sind, ob SRAM-produzierende 
Unternehmen über Marktmacht verfügen, wie hoch Kosten-Preis-Spannen sind und ob die 
Marktmacht im ersten Jahr ab der Markteinführung der SRAM-Chips größer ist.  
 
Für das Modell, das aus einer Nachfragefunktion und einer Preisrelation besteht, werden 
verschiedene Spezifikationen von Grenzkostenfunktionen (lineare, exponentielle, 
quadratische) verwendet und auf vier Generationen von SRAM-Chips (16KB, 64KB, 256KB, 
1MB) angewandt. Als Grundlage dient dabei die Arbeit von Genesove und Mullin (1998), die 
den NEIO-Ansatz an der US-amerikanischen Zuckerindustrie testen.  
 
Die Ergebnisse, die nur für die 64KB und die 256KB Generation sinnvoll und interpretierbar 
sind, lassen auf eine oligopolistische Marktstruktur schließen. Unternehmen verfügen also 
über Marktmacht um den Preis über die Grenzkosten setzen zu können. Jedoch müssen die 
Resultate dieser Schätzungen angezweifelt werden, da das Modell nicht auf alle vier 
ausgewählten Generationen angewandt werden kann und nur wenige Beobachtungen pro 
Generation existieren.  
 
Der Vermutung, dass die Marktmacht in der Einführungsphase des Produktlebenszyklus (die 
auch von sehr hohen Preisen geprägt ist) größer ist, kann nicht wirklich zugestimmt werden. 
Ein Vergleich des errechneten Lerner Index mit dem Preis der SRAM-Chips bestätigt zwar, 
dass höhere Preise mit höheren Werten des Lerner Index und deshalb mit größerer 
Marktmacht zur Markteinführung der Chips einher gehen. Die Modell-Schätzungen brachten 
jedoch gegensätzliche Ergebnisse: In der Anfangsphase der SRAM-Produktion seien die 
Grenzkosten höher als die Marktpreise. Die Tatsache, dass das Marktverhalten der 
Unternehmen innerhalb des Produktlebenszyklus nicht konstant bleibt (wie die Annahme des 
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Modells voraussetzt), könnte ein Grund für die zweifelhaften und unterschiedlichen Resultate 
sein.  
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